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Abstract 
The research paper addresses the evolution of corporate governance in Germany with a 
particular regard to whether there can be observed a gradual convergence to a shareholder 
primacy corporate governance system. In order to investigate a potential shift of the German 
corporate governance system to an Anglo-American tiled corporate governance system we have 
empirically assessed on a polynomial base fifty-two separate company and corporate 
governance variables for twenty years (1995-2014). Our research suggests that a gradual 
convergence has taken place prior to the global financial crisis. However, our results suggest 
that the convergence process experienced a slowdown in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, which may be linked to the stability of the German corporate governance system during 
the global financial crisis and the political environment during this time. Our paper does not 
only contribute to the research by analysing the development of the German corporate 
governance system but also by identifying new reasons for this development and by explaining 
why a new convergence process may be observed in the future again. 
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Introduction to the corporate governance debate in Germany 
The international corporate governance debate reached Germany rather comparatively late, in 
the second half of the 1990s.1 This was partly a reaction to a period of economic difficulty that 
Germany experienced in the years after the reunification in 1990. Till then the model of the so-
called ‘Rhenish capitalism’ of West Germany was characterised by features such as a strong 
welfare state, bank loans being the primary source of finance, cross-ownership concentrated in 
few shareholders, little institutional investor pressure and, most significantly, compulsory board 
membership of employee representatives.2 This system came under pressure in an era of 
increasing globalisation. International competition, liberalised capital markets and the weaker 
performance of the German economy in the 1990s questioned the viability of the German 
economic model.3 The discussions about necessary reforms of German company law eventually 
led to the introduction of corporate governance in Germany. As this article will show, Germany 
has witnessed several changes to its company law and corporate governance system since the 
late 1990s. These reforms raise the question to what extent the German system of company law 
and corporate governance has converged or is gradually converging with the Anglo-American 
system of shareholder value.4 
We sought to empirically track the development and transmutation of German corporate 
governance into an Anglo-American tiled corporate governance system. In the empirical phase 
of the research we collected data on fifty-two separate company and corporate governance 
variables based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and previous indices for 
twenty years (1995-2014). The variables were scaled polynomially, i.e., the value could be zero, 
or one, or two which meant the survey went beyond a simple yes/no response in order to take 
into account systems which use optional rules or ‘soft law’. 
We argue that Germany has experienced a period of gradual convergence towards shareholder 
value corporate governance system from the Mid 1990s till the beginning of the global financial 
and economic crisis. However, we find that whilst this convergence has not stopped it has, at 
least, significantly slowed down since 2008-2009. It appears as if the unique features of the 
German corporate governance systems such as the pluralist purpose of the company and the 
                                                            
1 J J du Plessis and I Saenger, ‘An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate in Germany’ in J du Plessis et 
al., German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (2nd edn, Springer 2012) 16. 
2 See, for example, J Edwards and M Nibler, ‘Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and 
ownership concentration’ (2000) 15 Economic Policy 240; S Vitols, ‘Negotiated Shareholder Value: the German 
Variant of an Anglo-American Practice’ (2004) 8 Competition & Change 357. 
3 See G Volk, ‘Deutsche Corporate Governance-Konzepte’ (2001) DStR 412. 
4 See A Gamble and J Kelly, ‘Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK’ (2001) 9 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 110. 
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employee representation at board level have enjoyed renewed support since the onset of the 
crisis. In our view, this development is linked to the relatively strong performance of the 
German economy post 2008 which has led to more content with the present German system of 
corporate governance. We argue that in addition to the economic parameters the political 
environment has further contributed to the stabilisation of the German corporate governance 
system. Between 2005-2009 and again since 2013 Germany has been governed by a grand 
coalition of the two main centre-right and centre-left parties. This focus on the political centre 
has also led to a consensus between labour and the employer side which has reduced the appetite 
for reforms. However, the process of globalisation and the increasingly international investment 
structures will continue to put pressure on the German pluralist model of corporate governance. 
It is to be expected that those pressures will lead to a gradual, albeit slow convergence with 
some features of shareholder value corporate governance. However, at present, we do not 
anticipate a full convergence, but rather expect the German system to retain features such as 
employee participation at board level at least in the short to mid-term future. 
Empirical Methodology 
This paper will thematically follow the shareholder primacy corporate governance principle as 
outlined by Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman: 
1. ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class; 
2. the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the 
corporation in the interests of its shareholders;  
3. other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers, 
should have their interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than 
through participation in corporate governance; 
4. non-controlling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the 
hands of controlling shareholders; and 
5. the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal measure of 
its shareholders’ interests 
Based on this classification, the researcher will broadly look into increased shareholder rights, 
increased market for corporate control, reduced managerial and stakeholder rights as outlined 
in the OECD principles of corporate governance. 
Gelöscht: employee 
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The dilemma in choosing between hard law and soft law, between statute books, private 
contractual regulations (like listing rules) and non-binding governance codes impacts on the 
aim of the research. It can be methodologically dealt with to a large extent by following an 
ordered response model offering choice from multiple options instead of a binary option. 
Financial development depends to a large extent on the availability of funds to primary and 
secondary markets. These markets are governed by listing rules and companies who want to 
raise money from these markets would have to adhere to these rules. Listing rules have become 
quite expansive over the years and in many ways set a higher disclosure and shareholder rights 
benchmark for companies. However, the soft laws; the corporate governance codes, the general 
practice etc. though usually non-binding and do not have the force of a statutory law or judicial 
precedent are an equally important indicator of the overall trend of a country towards achieving 
greater corporate governance. Thus, for each variable the researcher will first direct the legal 
survey towards the listing agreements of the share market with the highest market capitalisation 
in a country. If the variable is not addressed by the listing agreement then the survey will take 
into account the company and securities law focussing on statutes enacted at a federal level. 
For every variable which is addressed by hard law and enforceable, generally by the market 
regulator, and justiciable, usually by courts will be coded as 2. If the variable is not adequately 
dealt with by hard law the survey will move to soft law such as non-binding corporate 
governance codes, codes of ethics for company executives and self-governing codes like City 
codes etc. These variables would be coded as 1. If the variable is not dealt with by either hard 
law or soft law it will be coded as 0. Therefore, unlike the early research by La Porta et al., this 
research will not compile the compulsory minimum standard of corporate gove nance, neither 
will this research arbitrarily source some variables from hard law and others from soft law. For 
each variable which can be dealt with by regulation there will be a three-stage ordered response 
– no law 0, soft law 1 and hard law 2. This will not only capture a wider picture of the 
implementation of corporate governance policies in different jurisdictions, but will also be 
useful in intra-code comparison and finding out which portions of corporate governance tend 
to be implemented differently via soft law etc. 
The article also uses a financial development analysis for a simple comparison/contrast with 
the change in corporate governance. The financial market development index is a Bayesian 
factor analysis of five individual variables - Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), market 
capitalisation of listed companies, number of listed domestic companies, S&P global equity 
index and volume of stocks traded. 
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The variables used are provided in Appendix A and a sample questionnaire used to collect data 
is provided in Appendix B. 
Distinguishing features of German corporate governance 
German companies can be differentiated into public limited companies (Aktiengesellschaft), 
abbreviated as ‘AG’ and private limited companies (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung), 
abbreviated as ‘GmbH’. These two types of companies are regulated by separate Acts of 
Parliament: The Aktiengesetz (‘AktG’) deals with public limited companies and the Gesetz 
betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (‘GmbHG’) deals with private limited 
companies. Although the word Aktiengesellschaft is often translated into English as ‘joint stock 
corporation’,5 the more widely used reference to it in English is ‘public limited company’.6 For 
ease of understanding, this article will also refer to public limited companies. The position of 
German AGs has, in recent years, been challenged by the European company (SE). However, 
the AG has so far defended its leading position among German companies.7 
From an international and comparative perspective, German company law is an interesting area 
of study as it exhibits some characteristic features that differ significantly from the Anglo-
American organisation of company law and corporate governance.8 Germany is generally called 
a stakeholder value or pluralistic system which puts it into strong difference to Anglo-American 
approaches to company law.9 The probably most widely discussed distinguishing feature of 
German company law is the compulsory boardroom representation of employees, known as co-
determination.10 A public limited company must have a dual board, consisting of a management 
board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).11 Whilst the members of the 
                                                            
5 For example, the law firm Norton Rose published an English translation of the Aktiengesetz in 2013 in which it 
called the Act ‘German Stock Corporation Act’. The translation can be accessed at 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf 
(accessed 11 September 2016). 
6 See the discussion of terminology in J J du Plessis et al, ‘An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law 
and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted’ in J J du Plessis et al, German Corporate 
Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 2nd edn, 2012) 5. 
7 See G Deipenbrock, ‘Sustainable development, the interest(s) of the company and the role of the board from 
the perspective of a German Aktiengesellschaft’, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series No. 2010-02, 9-10. 
8 M Goergen et al., ‘Recent developments in German corporate governance’ (2008) 28 International Review of 
Law and Economics 1. 
9 S Wen, ‘The magnitude of shareholder value as the overriding objective in the UK: the post-crisis perspective’ 
(2011) 26 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 326. 
10 See M Roth, ‘Employee participation, corporate governance and the firm: A transatlantic view focussed on 
occupational pensions and co-determination’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 53; see J J 
du Plessis and O Sandrock, ‘The rise and fall of supervisory codetermination in Germany?’ (2005) 16 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 67-79. 
11 See for a detailed assessment of the system of co-determination: O Sandrock and J J du Plessis, ‘The German 
System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees’ in J J du Plessis et al., German Corporate Governance 
in International and European Context (Springer, 2nd edn, 2012) chapter 5. 
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management board are all executive directors who run the business on a day-to-day basis12, the 
members of the supervisory board are tasked with supervising the conduct of the members of 
the management board and advising them on future business decisions.13 The functional 
separation between the management board and the supervisory board guarantees a sophisticated 
level of decision making within the company. The composition of the supervisory board is 
subject to statutory rules regarding the inclusion of employee representation. A public limited 
company that has more than 500 employees and less than 2000 employees has to have 30% 
employee representation on the board.14 In the case of a company with 2000 or more employees, 
the employee representatives have got to make up 50% of the members of the supervisory 
board.15 The other half are elected by the shareholders. If there is a decision where both sides 
cannot agree, the chairman of the company has got the final say.16 The casting vote of the 
chairman inhibits equal co-determination as the chairman is a shareholder representative.17 
However, the purpose of the employee representation is to lead to more consensual decision-
making which integrates the perspectives of the employees into the running of the business. 
The dual board structure with mandatory employee representation in supervisory boards is an 
entrenched feature of German company law that has survived the pressures of globalisation and 
the legislative changes since the 1990s that are discussed in this paper. Debates about the 
functioning of the supervisory boards were one of the key issues in the corporate governance 
                                                            
12 Section 76 (1) AktG; A Ross, K Crossan, ‘A review of the influence of corporate governance on the banking 
crises in the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2012) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society 215, 219; M Rahman and C Carpano, ‘National corporate social policy, corporate 
governance systems, and organizational capabilities’ (2017) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society 13, 20. 
13 Section 111 AktG; M Habersack in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 
2018) § 111, para 12; H Merkt, ‘Germany- Internal and external corporate governance’ in A Fleckner and K 
Hopt (ed), Comparative Corporate Governance- A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 533; A Ross, K Crossan, ‘A review of the influence of corporate governance on the 
banking crises in the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2012) Corporate Governance: The International Journal 
of Business in Society 215, 220; M Rahman and C Carpano, ‘National corporate social policy, corporate 
governance systems, and organizational capabilities’ (2017) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society 13, 20. 
14 Section 4 DrittelbG (Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat). This Act can be 
translated into English as ‘One-Third Participation Act‘. 
15 Section 7 MitbestG (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). This Act can be translated into English as ‘Codetermination 
Act’. 
16 Section 29 (2) MitbestG. 
17 H Merkt, ‘Germany- Internal and external corporate governance’ in A Fleckner and K Hopt (ed), Comparative 
Corporate Governance- A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2013) 533; S 
Renaud, ‘Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination in Germany’ (2007) Labour – Review of 
Labour Economics and Industrial Relations 689, 690; M Poole, R Lansbury, and N Wiles, ‘A Comparative 
Analysis of Developments in Industrial Democracy’ (2001) Industrial Relations 490, 505; M Rahman and C 
Carpano, ‘National corporate social policy, corporate governance systems, and organizational capabilities’ 
(2017) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 13, 20. 
Gelöscht:  we
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discussions since the late 1990s and this issue has thus been a major topic in the German 
corporate governance debate.18 
Apart from co-determination another important feature of the stakeholder orientation of 
German companies is the question of the purpose of the company (Unternehmensinteresse). 
The AktG stipulates that the management board has direct responsibility for the management 
of the company.19 Whilst the 1965 AktG did not repeat the public welfare clause of the German 
Aktiengesetz of 1937, it is generally considered that this provision is still valid.20 The 
commentary notes that, when the 1965 Act was drafted, the general view was that it would go 
without saying that the directors have to take into account equally the interests of shareholders, 
employees and the public.21 It would therefore not need to be expressly written down in the 
Act. At present, this pluralistic view of directors’ duties is still considered to be the generally 
accepted, yet not undisputed, view.22 However, since the 1990s, there has been an increasing 
influence of the idea of shareholder value in Germany due to the opening of the German capital 
markets to a more international audience.23 Contrary to this trend, a particularly important 
development was an amendment of the German Corporate Governance Code in 2009, i.e. after 
the onset of the global economic and financial crisis. The Code now defines the tasks of the 
management board in the following way:  
The Management Board is responsible for independently managing the enterprise in the 
interest of the enterprise, thus taking into account the interests of the shareholders, its 
employees and other stakeholders, with the objective of sustainable creation of value.24 
This stakeholder-oriented definition of the interest of the enterprise is significant as it reinforces 
the traditional view that, in their decision-making process, directors have to take into account 
                                                            
18 See also J J du Plessis and I Saenger, ‘An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate in Germany’ in J J 
du Plessis et al., German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (2nd edn, Springer 2012) 
pp 22-30. 
19 Section 76 (1) AktG. 
20 H Fleischer in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts (Verlag C.H. Beck 2006) section 1; H Merkt, 
‘Germany: Internal and external corporate governance’ in A Fleckner, K Hopt (eds), Comparative Corporate 
Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2013) 537 . 
21 See G Spindler in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (3rd edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2008) section 76, para 
65; H Fleischer in Spindler/Stilz (eds) Aktiengesetz (3rd edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2015) section 76, para 23; Hüffer/ 
Koch in Aktiengesetz (12th edn.; Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) § 76, para 30. 
22 See H Merkt, ‘Germany: Internal and external corporate governance’ in A Fleckner, K Hopt (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 536; G Volk, ‘Deutsche Corporate Governance-Konzepte‘ (2001) Das deutsche Steuerrecht 412; P Ulmer, 
Aktienrecht im Wandel – Entwicklungslinien und Diskussionsschwerpunkte (2002) Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 143, 158. 
23 See for an analysis of shareholder value and section 76 of the AktG: H Fleischer in Spindler/Stilz (eds) 
Aktiengesetz (3rd edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2015) section 76, paras 29-42; K Bottenberg et al., Corporate 
Governance between Shareholder and Stakeholder Orientation: Lessons from Germany (2017) Journal of 
Management Inquiry 165, 169. 
24 German Corporate Governance Code, 4.1.1. 
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the views of different stakeholders and that shareholders do not take priority in that process. 
Although the Code is not a law, this provision strengthens the pluralistic understanding of the 
corporation. However, although this amendment to the Code demonstrates that the triumph of 
shareholder value is, at least in Germany, not certain, the management board nevertheless 
continues to be subject to the pressures of financial markets and shareholders interest in 
dividends.25  
Historic development: From company law to corporate governance? 
The 1965 Act on public limited companies was the most significant reform of the German law 
on public limited companies after World War II. It replaced the 1937 Act.26 Although the 1937 
Act was not regarded to be a typical Nazi regime Act, soon after World War II there has been 
a call for the amendment and modernisation of the 1937 Act. The declared objectives of this 
reform were achieving more transparency, strengthening shareholder rights, and an improving 
the protection of minority shareholders.27 The 1965 Act has remarkably shaped the present 
German law on public limited companies. However, not only the law makers but also the 
jurisprudence played a key role in shaping the present German law on public limited companies 
in the aftermath of the enactment of the 1965 Act. Cases such as Kali & Salz28, Holzmann29, 
and Holzmüller30 which were mainly concerned with the protection of shareholder rights were 
of outstanding importance for subsequent reforms. Reforms of the law on public limited 
companies in the decades after the 1965 Act primarily concerned issues such as, inter alia, 
capital markets law, technical developments, implementations of EU Dir ctives or, indeed, 
corporate governance.31 Some of the reforms were amendments to the AktG whilst others were 
reforms outside this Act. A particularly important reform was the Co-determination Act of 1976 
which introduced the equal representation of employees in supervisory boards of large 
corporations. Several legislative amendments were made in the year 1998 (six in total). In that 
year, no-par-value shares were introduced, shareholder rights were strengthened, and the 
commercial law was reformed, too. The 1998 reforms are, to some extent, considered to be a 
                                                            
25 D Hexel, ‘10 Jahre Corporate Governance in Deutschland: Eine Bestandsaufnahme aus gewerkschaftlicher 
Sicht‘ (2012) AuR 334, 336. 
26 See for an overview of the historic development: C Windbichler, Hueck/Windbichler Gesellschaftsrecht (21st 
edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2008) pp 278-287.  
27 M Habersack in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2016) Einführung para, 
25. 
28 BGH NJW 1978, 1316. 
29 BGH NJW 1982, 2444. 
30 BGH NJW 1982, 1703. 
31 P Ulmer, Aktienrecht im Wandel – Entwicklungslinien und Diskussionsschwerpunkte (2002) Archiv für die 
civilistische Praxis 143, 147. 
Gelöscht: Once the process of reforming the 1937 Act had started, 
the proposals elaborated by the Ministry of Justice led to an ongoing 
debate amongst politicians and scholars. 
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consequence of corporate failures in the 1990s which led to calls for an improved corporate 
governance, e.g. more efficient supervisory boards.32 Equally, the need for more capital led to 
companies to sell their shares at foreign stock markets. This, in turn, necessitated an adaption 
to foreign principles of corporate governance.33 
The 2000s saw further important changes to German company law and corporate governance, 
both prior to and post the economic and financial crisis.34 The primary goal was to improve the 
corporate governance of German listed companies.35 The introduction of the German Corporate 
Governance Code in 2002 will be addressed in a separate section below. The Transparency and 
Disclosure Law of 2002 complements the rules about the cooperation between the managing 
board and the supervisory board as well as linking the AktG to the newly introduced German 
Corporate Governance Code.37 A further important milestone was the 2005 Act on the 
Disclosure of the Compensation of Members of the Managing Board.38 This Act requires the 
individual disclosure of the remuneration of members of the managing board which was 
previously only a recommendation of the German Corporate Governance Code. Executive pay 
was further addressed in the 2009 Act regarding the Appropriateness of Management Board 
Compensation which requires the compensation structure to be directed towards the sustainable 
growth of the company.39 Although, as the name suggests, the Act to Modernise the Law on 
Private Limited Companies and to Combat Abuses of 2008, primarily focussed on private 
limited companies, it also contained changes for public limited companies such as amendments 
to the rules regarding the disqualification of directors.40 To date, the German law on public 
limited companies remains a topic for legislative interventions. In 2015, a requirement for co-
determined supervisory boards of 30 percent female members was established by law.41  
                                                            
32 G Volk, ‘Deutsche Corporate Governance-Konzepte‘ (2001) Das deutsche Steuerrecht 412; P Ulmer, 
Aktienrecht im Wandel – Entwicklungslinien und Diskussionsschwerpunkte (2002) Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 143, 146. 
33 M Habersack in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) Einführung, para 
38. 
34 For an overview of the reforms prior to the financial crisis see: P Klages, ‘The contractual turn: how legal 
experts shaped corporate governance reforms in Germany’ (2013) Socio Economic Review, 159. 
35 ibid, para 52. 
37 M Habersack in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) Einführung, 
paras 56-58. 
38 R von Rosen, Corporate governance in Germany (2007) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 30, 
35. 
39 M Habersack in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) Einführung, para 
70. 
40 ibid, para 66. 
41 Art 3 Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der 
Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst vom 24.04.2015. 
Gelöscht: . It has been pointed out that the increasing frequency of 
reforms since 1998 would be notable.36 
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Also, the increasing internationalisation of company law led to the reception of some Anglo-
American legal transplants into German company law since the 1990s.42 This further fuelled 
the debate about whether or not there would be a gradual convergence of company law systems 
around the world and, in particular, if German company law was converging with the Anglo-
American model of shareholder value.43 This debate has been part of Fleischer’s analysis of 
some foreign legal transplants that were received in the German law on public limited 
companies such as the business judgment rule or the corporate compliance responsibility of 
executive directors.44 The business judgment rule was adopted by the German Federal Court of 
Justice in 1997 and codified in the AktG in 2005.45 Fleischer also looked at the increasing 
influence of the Anglo-American idea of shareholder value and how there was room for it in 
the duty of the management board to manage the company.46 However, his article was written 
in 2004 and therefore five years before the clarification in the Code that directors of German 
public limited companies have to take into account the interests of the shareholders, its 
employees and other stakeholders.  
The German Corporate Governance Code 
One particular legal transplant was the introduction of a corporate governance code into the 
German legal system.47 As mentioned, the idea of a corporate governance code was taken up 
comparatively late in Germany.48 The idea of introducing a corporate governance code roots 
back to the introduction of the KonTraG49 in 1996 and was taken forward by two private 
initiatives in the year 2000.50 The first initiative were corporate governance principles for listed 
companies (‘Code of best Practice’), developed by the Policy Commission Corporate 
                                                            
42 G Cromme, Corporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance Code‘ (2005) 
Corporate Governance- An International Review, 362. 
43 For an overview of this debate see: M Goergen, M Manjon, and L Renneboog, ‘Is the German system of 
corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?‘ (2008) Journal of Management and 
Governance, 37; D Denis and J McConell, ‘International Corporate Governance‘(2003) Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 1. 
44 H Fleischer, ‘Legal Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht‘ (2004) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
1129. 
45 BGH, Urteil vom 21. April 1997, BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/Garmenbeck). The business judgment rule was 
codified in section 93 (1) 2 of the AktG. 
46 H Fleischer, ‘Legal Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht‘ (2004) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
1129, 1131. 
47 Theisen calls the Code an ‘import‘, see M Theisen, ‘Aufstieg und Fall der Idee vom Deutschen Corporate 
Governance Kodex - Analyse eines deutschen Sonderwegs –‘ (2014) 37 Der Betrieb 2057, 2064. 
48 von Werder in Kremer/Bachmann/Lutter/v.Werder (eds), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 
Kommentar (8th edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2018) 2. Teil Vorbemerkung, para 6. 
49 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich. This Act can be translated into English as 
‘Law on control and transparency in business‘. 
50 G Cromme, Corporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance Code‘ (2005) 
Corporate Governance- An International Review, 362, 364. 
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Governance. These principles were known as the Frankfurter principles.51 The second initiative 
was a draft code, developed by the Berliner Initiative German Code of Corporate Governance 
(GCCG).52 The two proposals are based on an international model, yet are different in their 
design, content and the level of detail. However, it was seen critically that two codes could exist 
in parallel.  
The Ministry of Justice, therefore, appointed initially 12 (then 13) prominent figures from 
business, academia and public life as the so-called codex commission under the lead of the head 
of the supervisory board of ThyssenKrupp, Dr Gerhard Cromme.55 The commission was tasked 
with the development of a German Corporate Governance Code. The initial composition of the 
codex commission demonstrated an attempt to include all stakeholders that were affected by 
the code. Therefore, the members came from listed companies, banks, financial services as well 
as shareholder representatives and academia.56 The law only indicates the role of the 
commission by presupposing its existence and by mentioning that the commission gives 
recommendations. At its inception, the mandate of the commission was specified by the then 
Ministry of Justice Däubler-Gmelin who said that the commission should develop a German 
Corporate Governance Code on the basis of the law and should scrutinise it periodically. The 
German Corporate Governance Code (hereafter: ‘the Code’) was adopted on 26 February 2002. 
The overall objective of the Code is to promote the confidence of investors, customers, 
employees and the general public in German corporate governance in order to improve the 
standing of Germany as a location for international and national investors.58 Thus, the Code is 
available on a website both in German and in English so that a foreign audience can easily 
access it.59 The Code’s foreword describes its dual objectives: 
The German Corporate Governance Code (the "Code") presents essential statutory 
regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of German listed 
companies and contains internationally and nationally recognized standards for good 
and responsible governance. The Code aims to make the German Corporate Governance 
system transparent and understandable. Its purpose is to promote the trust of 
                                                            
51 M Lutter, ‘Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex‘ in P Hommelhoff, K Hopt and A Werder (ed) Handbuch 
Corporate Governance- Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftspraxis (2nd edn, Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag und Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG 2009) 123, 124. 
52 N Pfitzer and P Oser, M Schiller, ‘Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex- Ein Handbuch für 
Entscheidungsträger‘ (Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag 2003) 15. 
55 ibid, para 9. 
56 W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2018) § 161, para 22. 
58 von Werder in Kremer/Bachmann/Lutter/v.Werder (eds), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 
Kommentar (8th edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2018) 2. Teil Vorbemerkung, para 33; M Schiller, ‘Der Deutsche 
Corporate Governance Kodex- Ziele, Wirkungen, Anwendungs- und Haftungsfragen‘ (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller 
2005) 20. 
59 See http://www.dcgk.de/en/home.html (accessed 11 September 2016). 
Gelöscht: The idea of a German Corporate Governance Code, 
based on an international model that both initiatives took forward was 
positively received.53 
Gelöscht: Therefore, the government commission Corporate 
Governance, which, too, was appointed in the year 2000 
recommended the implementation of a further commission for the 
development of a uniform German Corporate Governance Code.54
Gelöscht: followed the recommendation of the government 
commission and …
Gelöscht: The Ministry of Justice has got the competence to 
increase or reduce the membership of the commission, to remove 
members or even to dissolve the commission.57 
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international and national investors, customers, employees and the general public in the 
management and supervision of listed German stock corporations.60 
The Code therefore serves the dual function of both presenting the main statutory regulations 
for public limited companies, as found in the AktG, and formulating standards of good 
corporate governance which may go beyond the rules, prescribed by statute.61 The first 
objective, the presentation of the main principles of the German law on public limited 
companies makes the rules more accessible to an international audience as the German AktG is 
written in German and, to date, only a non-official translation by an international law firm is 
available online.62 This has been called the ‘communicative function of the Code’.63 
The code applies only to listed companies and compliance with it is not mandatory. Including 
the foreword, it is divided into seven sections, for instance, one on the management board and 
one on the supervisory board. As described in the foreword, the Code consists of three types of 
provisions: First, there are recommendations which are marked by the word ‘shall’.64 
Companies are allowed to deviate from these recommendations, but they are then required to 
disclose this annually and to give an explanation for this (‘comply or explain’). The basic idea 
behind this approach is that companies then have flexibility. Second, the Code contains 
suggestions (marked by the term ‘should’). Companies do not have to disclose deviations from 
these provisions. Third, the remaining components of the code are not marked by the terms 
‘shall’ or ‘should’ and are merely descriptions of legal regulations or explanations.65 
An interesting feature of the German approach is that section 161 of the AktG imposes a 
statutory duty on the supervisory boards and management boards of all listed companies to 
annually issue on their website a declaration of compliance with the recommendations of the 
Code which are provisions phrased with the word ‘shall’.66 This declaration must state whether 
the company has complied with the recommendations in the Code and they must provide an 
                                                            
60 German Corporate Governance Code, Foreword, available at: http://www.dcgk.de/en/code//foreword.html 
(accessed 11 September 2016). 
61 M Schiller, ‘Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex- Ziele, Wirkungen, Anwendungs- und 
Haftungsfragen‘ (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller 2005) 20. 
62 Norton Rose, German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz English translation as at September 18, 2013, 
available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-109100.pdf (accessed 11 
September 2016). 
63 von Werder in Kremer/Bachmann/Lutter/v.Werder (eds), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 
Kommentar (6th edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2016) 3. Teil Kommentierung Präambel, para 102. 
64 M Lutter, ‘Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex‘ in P Hommelhoff, K Hopt and A Werder (ed) Handbuch 
Corporate Governance- Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftspraxis (2nd edn, Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag und Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG 2009) 123, 124. 
65 See also W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) § 161, para 
23. 
66Section 161 AktG; R von Rosen, Corporate governance in Germany (2007) Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance 30, 33. 
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explanation if they have not complied or will not comply with the recommendations. Section 
161 requires companies to make that declaration both with regards to their actions in the past 
as well as in the future (whether the company will comply with the Code’s provisions).67 Whilst 
this section does not require companies to comply with the recommendations of the Code 
(following the ‘comply or explain’ principle), the management board and supervisory board 
can be liable if the company does not correspond with its duty of declaration.68 Also, the 
German Federal Court of Justice ruled that the validity of a resolution to release management 
board members and supervisory board members from liability could be challenged if the 
declaration of compliance was false.69 The Baums Commission was of the opinion that the 
compliance with the ‘comply or explain’ principle should not be left to the individual 
companies, but that rather a middle way between non-binding rules and complete bindingness 
would be preferable.70 
The Corporate Governance Code does not fit easily into the German civil law system. The 
concept of such a code originates in English law as a common law system and a much more 
widespread use of codes. The code has therefore given rise to a debate about is legal quality. 
The commentary of the Code hence makes clear that ‘it is no law’.72 A classification within the 
usual hierarchy of legislation seems to be rather difficult since it is a form of self-regulation 
(soft law) which does not establish any binding rules that go beyond the pertinent statutory 
provisions.73 This however, still does not allow any inference to its actual legal quality.74 It has 
been discussed whether it could also be classified as a codified form of trade practices. 
However, the declared purpose of the code as a code of ‘best practice’ is not to refelect the 
current trade practices but rather to improve these practices.75 Another argument against the 
classification as a form of trade practices is that the code explicitly offers the possibility to opt 
                                                            
67 See also W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2018) § 161, paras 
40- 44; Hüffer/ Koch in Aktiengesetz (12th edn.; Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) § 161, paras 14-22. 
68 K Kiethe, ‘Falsche Erklärung nach § 161 AktG - Haftungsverschärfung für Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat?‘ 
(2003) 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 559; W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz 
(4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2018) § 161, paras 97- 102; Hüffer/ Koch in Aktiengesetz (12th edn.; Verlag 
C.H.Beck 2016) § 161, paras 25-30. 
69 Bundesgerichtshof, Urteil vom 16.02.2009 - II ZR 185/07. See also: S Goslar and K von der Linden, ‘§ 161 
AktG und die Anfechtbarkeit von Entlastungsbeschlüssen‘ (2009) 34 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
1321. 
70 See W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) § 161, para 11. 
72 von Werder in Kremer/Bachmann/Lutter/v.Werder (eds), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 
Kommentar (6th edn, Verlag C.H. Beck 2016) 2. Teil Vorbemerkung, para 80. 
73 T Heldt/R Fischer zu Cramburg in T Heidel (ed) Aktienrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht (4th edn, Nomos 2014) 
2036. 
74 P Ulmer, ‘Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex- ein neues Regulierungsinstrument für börsennotierte 
Aktiengesellschaften‘ (2002) Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 150, 159. 
75 S Berg and M Stöcker, ‘Anwendungs- und Haftungsfragen zum deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex 
(2002) Wertpapiermitteilungen 1569, 1571. 
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out of the rules of the Corporate Governance Code without any legal consequences.76 Therefore, 
it is not binding which in contrast is a key characteristic of trade practices. Although there have 
been different attempts of a legal classification amongst scholars, the legal quality of the 
Corporate Governance Code remains open.77 Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate about the 
question of whether or not the statutory declaration of compliance pursuant to section 161 of 
the AktG is constitutional or not.78 Yet, it is agreed that the Code can only fill in the margins 
that the statutory provisions leave.79 
The German Corporate Governance Code has been regularly amended since it was introduced. 
The foreword of the Code states, that ‘as a rule the Code will be reviewed annually against the 
background of national and international developments and be adjusted, if necessary’.80 The 
amendments that have been made, inter alia, aligned the Code with statutory developments such 
as the Management Compensation Disclosure Law. In particular, the changes to the Code 
focussed on improving the work of the supervisory board.81 However, this transplant remains 
subject to discussion.82 It has been argued that the German approach to the corporate 
governance code with the statutory declaration of compliance and the level of detail has led to 
a more positive reception in academia than in its addressee, the business community.83 It 
remains to be seen how the code will further develop in the years to come.  
Analysis of changepoint in corporate governance development in Germany 
                                                            
76 M Kort, ‘Corporate Governance Grundsätze als haftungsrechtlich relevante Standards’ in G Bitter et al. (ed) 
Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt zum 70. Geburtstag (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 2009) 945, 958. 
77 For an overview of the different explanations see P Ulmer, ‘Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex- ein 
neues Regulierungsinstrument für börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften‘ (2002) Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 150. 
78 W Goette in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Verlag C.H.Beck 2016) § 161, paras 26 – 31. 
79 W Bayer, ‘Grundsatzfragen der Regulierung der aktienrechtlichen Corporate Governance‘ (2013) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1, 3. 
80 German Corporate Governance Code, Foreword. 
81 J J du Plessis and I Saenger, ‘An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate in Germany’ in J du Plessis et 
al., German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (2nd edn, Springer 2012) 39. 
82 See, for example, G Spindler, ‘Zur Zukunft der Corporate Governance Kommission und des § 161 AktG‘ 
(2011) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1007. 
83 M Theisen, ‘Aufstieg und Fall der Idee vom Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex - Analyse eines 
deutschen Sonderwegs –‘ (2014) 37 Der Betrieb 2057, 2064; for an empirical overview of the compliance rates 
in Germany see: M Stiglbauer and P Velte, ‘Impact of soft law regulation by corporate governance codes on firm 
valuation: the case of Germany’ (2014) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 
395, 397. 
Gelöscht: ing
Gelöscht: ¶
Page 14 of 31Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
C
orporate G
overnance
 
This chart shows that the German system of corporate governance experienced a period of 
convergence with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance between 1998 and the 
beginning of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. In particular, the 1998 reforms 
of German company law and several amendments in the first half of the 2000s, including the 
introduction of the German Corporate Governance Code, show the convergence with 
shareholder value corporate governance. However, it is noticeable that there has been a 
stabilisation of the German system since 2009, i.e. since the beginning of the crisis. 
In our view, this slowdown in legal reform can be linked to economic and political factors. 
First, with regards to economic factors, it is important to note that Germany has experienced a 
period of economic strength since the economic crisis began. The German export-based 
economy has been strong in recent years and unemployment levels in Germany have gone down 
significantly.84 We argue that this economic environment has reduced the appetite for change. 
Quite in the contrary, this has led to a feeling that the German economic model, including its 
pluralist system of company law is rather successful. Consequently, traditional features such as 
employee representation at board level that might have appeared as being out of date in the 
early 2000s have again appeared to be part of a successful model. The leading shareholder value 
systems, the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, were hit harder by the 
crisis and its consequences. This situation had contributed to the feeling that there is not much 
                                                            
84 A Moravicsik, ‘Europe after the crisis: How to sustain a common currency’ (2012) 91 Foreign Affairs 54, 59; L 
Funk, ‘The German Economy during the Financial and Economic Crisis 2008/2009’ (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
2012) 27. 
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need for reform, rather that part of the strength of the German economy can be found in its 
corporate governance model. In this context it is interesting to consider that the periods of 
relative strong convergence towards Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance 
between the Mid 1990s and 2008 occurred during a period where Germany suffered a difficult 
economic period with high unemployment.85 It was even considered to be ‘the sick man of 
Europe’.86 In that situation, questions were asked about the viability of the traditional features 
of German corporate governance and how future-oriented it was. As a consequence of the high 
unemployment, the centre-left government consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
and the Green Party (1998-2005) reformed the German labour market and introduced cuts to 
the social welfare system. These reforms have become known as ‘Agenda 2010’ which were 
intended to modernise Germany and make its economy more competitive in a globalised 
world.87 These reforms coincide with the reforms of German company law and corporate 
governance towards the Anglo-American model such as the adoption of legal transplants such 
as the Corporate Governance Code. 
Since the German economy has regained strength in the aftermath of the financial crisis there 
seems to be a re-discovery and renewed appreciation of its consensus-based approach that tries 
to combine the interests of labour and employers at board level both at home and abroad. 
Consequently, changes to the traditional feature of employee boardroom representation as part 
of the system of co-determination are unlikely to happen in the short to medium term, at least 
as long as the economic performance remains strong.88 Rather than appearing outdated as in the 
1990s, these characteristics now seem to prevent the pursuit of short-term gains to the detriment 
of the long-term financial viability of companies and also to prevent excesses. 
In our view, the political situation has further contributed to the slowing down of reform and 
convergence with shareholder value. Since 2005 Germany has been governed by the centre-
right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) which has formed a grand coalition with the main 
centre-left party SPD between 2005-2009 and again since 2013 and 2017. Whilst, in theory, the 
strong majorities that these governments have in Parliament could lead to periods of frequent 
reforms, in practice they rather seem to lead to a consensus-based style of government between 
                                                            
85 L Funk, ‘The German Economy during the Financial and Economic Crisis 2008/2009’ (Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung 2012) 12.  
86 See ‘The sick man of the euro’ (2009) The Economist, available under: http://www.dcgk.de/en/home.html 
(accessed 20 October 2018). 
87 For an overview see: W Eichhorst and P Marx, ‘Reforming German labour market institutions: A dual path of 
flexibility’ (2011) 21 Journal of European Social Policy 73. 
88 K Bottenberg et al., ‘Corporate Governance between Shareholder and Stakeholder Orientation: Lessons from 
Germany’ (2017) Journal of Management Inquiry 165, 169. 
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the employee and labour side with limited reform. Moreover, at least since the crisis was 
overcome in Germany, the government did not feel the need the need for much reform in light 
of the strong economic performance and the good figures from the labour market. The current 
economic and political environment therefore suggests that the German corporate governance 
model is likely to be strengthened rather than weakened in the short to medium term future.  
Analysis in financial market development in Germany 
 
The development of the financial market development points at a further ground for 
stabilisation of German corporate governance as it is slower and steadier than in the United 
Kingdom or the USA. An important feature of the German financial market is the limited 
shareholding by the general public. Investment into shares has traditionally been low in 
Germany as saving accounts used to be very popular. Equity cross-holdings and firm interlocks, 
therefore a less dispersed ownership structure, in contrast, are a very common feature in the 
German corporate landscape.89 
However, there has been increasing foreign investment in Germany in recent years. This will 
inevitably increase the pressure on German boards to increase dividends and pay greater 
attention to shareholder interests. Also, it is to be expected that foreign investors will push in 
                                                            
89 MP Basha, ‘Global corporate governance: debates and challenges’ (2004) Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society 5, 10; K Bottenberg et al., ‘Corporate Governance between 
Shareholder and Stakeholder Orientation: Lessons from Germany’ (2017) Journal of Management Inquiry 165, 
173. 
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the general direction of companies working in a similar fashion to Anglo-American companies. 
This situation can lead to a ‘clash of culture’ with uncertain outcome. For instance, the hedge 
fund Hermes has been particularly active in this regard in 2016 by pushing for a ‘shareholder 
revolt’ at the Annual General Meetings of Deutsche Bank and Volkswagen, two German 
companies that were in the news due to scandals.90 Whilst in the traditional German system of 
corporate governance, the powers of shareholders are limited and, instead, the supervisory 
board plays a key role in the control of the board, foreign investment funds are less likely to 
accept this approach, as evidenced by the activism of Hermes.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we find that whilst the German system of corporate governance has experienced 
a strong period of convergence with Anglo-American shareholder value between the Mid 1990s 
and the global economic and financial crisis, that this has slowed down significantly since then. 
We argue that this development needs to be understood in the context of the economic and 
political development of Germany. Whereas there was a weak economic performance of the 
German economy during the 1990s and right into the Mid 2000s, things have changed in recent 
years, especially after the crisis. Whilst the United Kingdom and the United States experienced 
a difficult economic period, Germany’s export-oriented economy regained strength and, 
consequently, the unemployment rates went down significantly. In light of this development 
the German corporate governance model did not seem as ‘outdated’ and ‘old-fashioned’ as it 
might have appeared during the 1990s and early 2000s. Consequently, there was a re-
appreciation of the advantages of this model and its inclusion of labour at board level. The 
interest in the pluralist model was renewed. Politically, this situation coincided with periods of 
grand coalitions between the major centre-right party CDU and the major centre-left party SPD 
which further added to the consensus-based approach between labour and employers. 
However, whilst this points at a stabilisation of the German pluralist model of corporate 
governance, it might well be that the next crisis will call this model into question again and thus 
lead to a stronger convergence again. Moreover, Germany continues to be subject to the 
pressures of globalisation and increasing foreign investment into its companies. This will lead 
to a stronger push for Anglo-American shareholder value and more rights for shareholders. The 
example of Hermes hedge fund in 2016 demonstrate such pressures which are likely to increase 
once the performance of companies is not as strong as it is at the moment.  
                                                            
90 For details see: Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/0dde3bac-fee2-11e4-84b2-00144feabdc0 
(accessed 21 October 2018). 
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We therefore argue that whilst there has been a growing recognition that the German pluralist 
model of corporate governance has its particular advantages and strengths it will remain under 
pressure and will be subject to a gradual convergence. However, the pace of that convergence 
will be much slower than expected in the Mid 2000s. However, it also needs to be taken into 
account that a large number of leading German companies are part of the Mittelstand and they 
are often family-owned companies which are not subject to the rules that apply to listed 
companies.91 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Corporate governance variables 
Shareholder rights index 
 Secure methods of ownership registration - 2 if a central depository is available and 
shares are mandatorily held in an electronic dematerialised format in the central 
depositories, 1 if there is a central depository but it is optional to have shares in 
dematerialised format, 0 if there is no central depository.  
The first step for a shareholder to claim these rights would be to prove himself a 
shareholder, with increasing cross-border holdings, registration often becomes the first 
hurdle. Thus, a pro-shareholder corporate governance regime would insist on an easy 
process with dematerialised shares which allow for electronic transfer especially 
through a central clearing house to reduce frauds, transaction time etc.    
 Transfer of shares – 2 if shares of listed/public companies which can be traded in the 
open market are fully transferable, 1 if there are restrictions at the discretion of 
companies and if a non-binding regulations call for full transferability of shares, 0 
                                                            
91 U Noack.and D Zetsche, ‘Corporate Governance Reform in Germany: The Second Decade’ (2005) European 
Business Law Review 1033, 1034. 
Gelöscht: Also
Gelöscht: Thus
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otherwise; 2 if foreign nationals are allowed to own and transfer shares and are treated 
on a par with the citizens of the host country, 1 if foreign nationals are allowed to own 
and transfer shares but with certain restrictions not placed on the citizens of the host 
country 0 if foreign nationals are not allowed to own or transfer shares. 
The founding pillar of pro-shareholder corporate governance allows the shareholders a 
free choice to exit a company. Hence there is a need for an equity market, the shares 
need to be fully transferable and there should not be an onerous burden on the 
shareholder to transfer the shares. Some jurisdictions may have some restrictions on 
transfer such as a lock in period for promoters, restriction on preference shares, partially 
paid up equity shares etc. In the majority of such cases these non-transferable shares are 
not allowed to be traded on the open market (though sometimes trade is allowed in 
private markets). Therefore, to allow uniformity, only those shares which can be traded 
on the open market (like common equity shares) need to be fully transferable. Some 
jurisdictions place extra burden on foreign nationals and thus increase the cost of access 
to capital, a pro-shareholder policy would allow foreign funds entry to the financial 
market as it would give shareholders more choice and would lead to a more vibrant 
equity market.    
 Regular and timely information – 2 if half yearly and annual reports are mandatorily 
sent to shareholders and a central registry, 1 if annual reports are sent to the central 
registry only and not to shareholders, 0 if no reports are sent or otherwise; 2 if it is 
statutorily mandated that an annual report includes at least five of the following: a. 
balance sheet, b. profit and loss statement, c. cash flow statement, d. statement of 
changes in ownership equity, e. notes on the financial statements and f. an audit report, 
1 if it is recommended under a non-binding code 0 if otherwise; 2 if financial reporting 
mandatorily is based on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
Page 20 of 31Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
C
orporate G
overnance
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding 
code 0 if otherwise. 
Timely and regular information is key in order to make an informed choice. 
Shareholders always suffer from an information gap, thus pro-shareholder corporate 
governance policies would always insist on higher burdens on companies to share the 
maximum possible financial reports on more than an annual basis. IFRS and ISA or 
comparable standards ensure that companies’ financial records comply with the globally 
accepted standards. This would allow easy comparisons across companies and help in 
shareholder choice.  
 Participate in shareholders meetings – 2 if the law explicitly mandates that any class of 
shareholders are allowed to attend the meeting and take part in discussion, 1 if it is a 
common practice backed by a non-binding code 0 otherwise; 2 if a law mandates that a 
proxy form to vote on the items on the agenda accompanies notice of the meeting or if 
shareholders may vote by mail on the items on the agenda, 1 if it is recommended by a 
non-binding code or is a general practice, 0 if under law/non-binding regulation/practice 
absent shareholders vote (or shareholders who have not returned the proxy form/postal 
ballot) is given to mangers by default; 2 if cross-border proxy voting is allowed without 
any restriction, 1 if it is allowed with some restriction or a non-binding governance code 
recommends cross-border proxy voting without restriction, 0 otherwise. 
Although some classes of shareholders like those holding preference shares are barred 
from voting, a policy which allows them to participate in the meeting (without voting) 
is more shareholder-friendly than regulations which completely bar the participation of 
nonvoting shareholders from general meetings. Further, in many highly dispersed 
companies it is not possible for the shareholder to attend the meetings and personally 
cast votes and proxies are generally used. A system which recognises shareholders as 
owners of the company would try to make it easier for more shareholder participation 
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rather than using regulatory loopholes. A further mark of a liberalised regime would be 
to allow foreign nationals to use proxies to cast their votes as it otherwise might be 
financially onerous on the foreign shareholder.   
 Dividend – 2 if shareholders can approve the amount of dividend to be paid with a 
simple majority, 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding regulation or code, 0 
otherwise; Shareholder primacy corporate governance ensures shareholder wealth 
maximisation, timely and appropriate dividends is one way. In many common law 
jurisdictions the board of directors decides the amount of dividend to be paid. Thus, 
shareholder approval by simple majority on the amount of dividend paid would ensure 
that shareholders have an indirect say on the amount of dividend rather than a situation 
where the board can itself decide and approve the dividend amount.  
 Supermajority for extraordinary transaction – 2 each if it is mandated by rule or statute 
that 75% or more shareholders need to agree for the following authorizing a) capital 
increases; b) waiving pre-emptive rights; c) buying back shares; d) amending articles of 
association; e) delisting; f) acquisitions, disposals, mergers and takeovers; g) changes 
to company business or objectives; h) making loans and investments beyond limits 
prescribed under prospectus; i) authorizing the board to: (i) sell or lease major assets; 
(ii) borrow money in excess of paid-up capital and free reserves, and (iii) appoint sole 
selling agents and apply to the court for the winding up of the company, 1 each if it is 
under a non-binding regulation with a comply or explain architecture or if it is a 
common practice, 0 otherwise. 
Shareholders should retain control over the board in the case of an extraordinary 
transaction which may affect the long term and short-term viability and profitability of 
the company. Buy back of shares, issuance of new shares and corporate restructuring 
generally lead to changes in the total paid up share capital and directly impacts on share 
prices. Capital restructuring can also lead to the consolidation of incumbent 
Gelöscht: short term
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management in a widely held company. This provision can be misused by majority 
shareholders who can issue new shares to themselves, waiving the pre-emptive rights 
of first refusal of the minority, this leads to further dilution of minority held shares. 
Moreover, with an increased number of shares the price of shares would generally fall 
thereby expropriating the share value of the minority. Similarly, significant changes to 
the asset base of the company would also impact on the prices of shares. Rights issues 
can also be used as a takeover defence. Some jurisdictions allow for some of these 
powers to be exercised directly by the board, some require a simple majority while 
others demand a supermajority. If a supermajority is required for these transactions, 
shareholders are able to get full ex-ante information about aspects limiting their rights 
that would normally be factored into the price of the security. This limitation on absolute 
board power would also enable minority shareholders to protect themselves from self-
dealing corporate insider expropriation by dilution, to an extent. 
 
Anti-Managerial rights index 
 Performance related pay - 2 if under law a minimum fixed portion of executive 
remuneration is performance linked, 1 if it is a common practice or recommended under 
a non-binding corporate governance code, 0 otherwise; 2 if executive remuneration 
requires shareholder approval, 1 if shareholder approval is only advisory, 0 otherwise; 
2 if there are statutory rules relating to stock option plans and stock linked pension funds 
exist, 1 if there is a non-binding code or regulation, 0 otherwise. 
One of the cornerstones of agency-based shareholder value maximisation of corporate 
governance is to align the interests of the managers and the employees to the interest of 
the shareholders i.e. to increase the price of shares on equity markets. This can be 
achieved if emphasis is placed on encouraging executives to take a major portion of 
their remuneration in stock options. Like the OECD principles of corporate governance 
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which states that performance related pay should be allowed to develop, most 
jurisdictions do not put in a fixed line as to how much executive compensation should 
be linked to the performance of share prices. However, a jurisdiction which wants to 
implement a performance-linked pay for executives will fix a minimum amount of 
compensation which must be linked to share performance. Similarly, for employees 
there can be stock-linked pension funds or employees stock ownership plans (ESOPs). 
In many jurisdictions these exist as general practice, however as it becomes more 
prevalent legislators tend to regulate it by bringing rules. Thus, the presence of guiding 
rules relating to ESOPs etc. acts as a proxy for the fact that performance related pay for 
employees has been generally accepted. Executive compensation is usually fixed by the 
remuneration committee, however, if shareholders need to approve the quantum of 
compensation, it adds another layer of shareholder control over the directors. 
 Proportionality of ownership of share and control – 2 if ordinary equity shares that do 
not carry a preference of any kind, neither for dividends nor for liquidation carry one 
vote per share,92 1 when a non-binding code discourages the existence of methods of 
disproportional control like multiple-voting and nonvoting ordinary shares, pyramid 
schemes or does not allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder 
irrespective of the number of shares owned, 0 otherwise 
Each shareholder should be given proportional equity control to the amount invested. 
However, over the years, due to financial requirements, various forms of shares have 
evolved – preference shares which have higher or fixed cash flow rights but sacrifice 
voting rights, golden shares which may contribute little to equity but have 
disproportionate voting rights etc.93 which are separate from ordinary equity shares. The 
                                                            
92 Even with a strict imposition of one share one vote rule, which should in theory nullify golden shares, there 
would be other ways like stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures and dual class equity structures which 
gives disproportional control delinked from cash flow rights by careful manipulation of common equity shares. 
93 See generally Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, ‘Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules’ (1988) 
20 Journal of Financial Economics 203-235 
Gelöscht: Similarly
Gelöscht: Thus
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survey will limit itself to one vote per one ordinary share to ensure proportionality of 
control across the ordinary equity class. Thus, for example, a jurisdiction which does 
not have any regulation on disproportionate voting rights like golden shares, pyramid 
schemes etc. would be scored 0.   
 Markets for corporate control -  2 if pre-offer takeover defences are statutorily banned, 
1 if there is a non-binding code which specifically discourages directors from using pre-
offer defences, 0 if there is no regulation; 2 if post-offer takeover defences are statutorily 
banned, 1 if there is a non-binding code which discourages directors from using post-
offer defences, 0 if there is no regulation; 2 if at least 25% or more shares are to be with 
the public for listed companies, 1 if there is a non-binding code for the same, 0 
otherwise; 2 if a declaration to the market by a shareholder holding 5% of share capital 
is necessary whenever their shareholding changes by more than 1-5% of the total 
subscribed share capital within a given period of time, 1 if the disclosure is 
recommended by a non-binding code, 0 otherwise;  
To ensure that the market for corporate control can function effectively, any pro-
shareholder corporate governance would try to restrict the powers of the incumbent 
managers to scupper takeover attempts. Takeover defences can be divided into two 
categories based on the time when they can be effected. Defences like the poison pill, 
automatic rights issue, golden parachute for executives, staggered board etc. are 
arranged before a bid is made for the control of the company. On the other hand, 
defences like targeted repurchase bids (coupled with white knight etc.), asset 
restructuring (crown jewel defence, scorched earth policy etc.), capital restructuring 
(issue of new shares to existing shareholders), greenmailing are usually set in motion 
once the takeover bid has already been made. ‘Poison pills provide their holders with 
special rights in the case of a triggering event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is 
approved by the board of directors, the poison pill can be revoked, but if the deal is not 
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approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered. Similarly, golden parachutes are 
severance agreements that provide cash and non-cash compensation to senior executives 
upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation following a change in 
control.’94 Rights issue (either contingent on takeover bid or post bid effected by 
incumbent management) allows for the issue of new shares to existing shareholders, this 
would lead to an increase in the number of shares and make it expensive for the raider 
to get majority control. As detailed in several pieces of research, takeover defences 
affect share prices and earnings.95 Thus, an ideal shareholder primacy corporate 
governance system would discourage takeover defences. It is also necessary to 
differentiate between pre-bid and post-bid defences as many jurisdictions allow some 
form of defence such as counter offers etc. which usually raises the share prices and 
thus offers a better exit to shareholders. Therefore, if a jurisdiction bans the incumbent 
management from executing pre-offer defences such as staggered board, poison pill, 
golden parachute, supermajority (over 80%) to approve merger, dual class 
recapitalisation then the jurisdiction would be coded 2, if some of them are banned and 
others are specifically discouraged by a non-binding code then the country is coded 1, 
if there is no code or rule then it is coded 0. Similarly, for post-bid defences the survey 
will look for laws and rules banning or discouraging asset restructuring, liability 
                                                            
94 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, ‘Corporate governance and equity price’ (2003) 118 (1) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 working paper available at < 
http://www.boardoptions.com/governancearticle.pdf>. In their seminal paper they studied 24 firm level corporate 
governance factors for 1500 large corporations for the period 1990-1999. The corporate governance provisions 
were divided into five thematic groups: tactics for delaying hostile bidders, director/officer protection, voting 
rights, other takeover defences, and State/laws.  Paul A. Gompers et al. focussed on anti-shareholder provisions 
in the company’s prospectus and other documents creating a ‘G index’ where higher scores meant lower 
shareholder rights. They then concentrated on two extreme ends of the index creating a ‘Dictatorship Portfolio’ 
of the firms with the weakest shareholder rights (G≥14), and a ‘Democracy Portfolio’ of the firms with the 
strongest shareholder rights (G ≤ 5).’   
95 See Richard S. Ruback, ‘An Overview of Takeover Defenses’ in Alan J. Auerbach, (ed.) Mergers and 
Acquisitions (University of Chicago Press 1987) table 3.1 and 3.2; Pornsit Jiraporn, ‘An empirical analysis of 
corporate takeover defences and earnings management: evidence from the US’ (2005) 15 (5) Applied Financial 
Economics 293-303.  
Gelöscht:  
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restructuring, capital restructuring and targeted repurchase (not open competitive 
bidding).  
In developing countries the share markets are generally illiquid and there is a high 
prevalence of block-holder directors. This situation can be remedied by having a 
minimum amount of shares with the public which may lead to more dispersed holding.96 
In India, which as per S&P is a leading emerging market, only recently was it made 
mandatory that for listing at least 25% of the shares should be with public. Therefore, 
to ensure that markets in developing countries move towards a more open market it is 
imperative that shares become more dispersed, the first step towards this would be a 
minimum of 25% free float.  
The disclosure rule for shareholders with 5% shareholding would nullify any attempts 
to effect a creeping acquisition and allow for proper share valuation due to an expected 
increase in demand.   
 Impediments to cross border voting – 2 if American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and 
Global depository receipt (GDR) with voting rights at par equity is allowed, 1 if ADR 
and GDR have voting rights with some restriction, 0 otherwise. 
An investment bank can buy shares of companies listed at a share market in a developing 
country and later issue a negotiable security linked to these issues at a stock exchange 
in a developed country. These negotiable securities are referred to as depository receipts 
and their value varies according to the price of the underlying share in the original host 
country. If depository receipts for foreign companies are issued in the US market they 
are referred as ADR and if these depository receipts are issued in the non US market97 
it is commonly referred to as GDR. ADR and GDR allow foreign capital to flow into 
                                                            
96 Though Cheffins et al. ‘Ownership Dispersion and the London Stock Exchange’s 'Two-Thirds Rule': An 
Empirical Test’ (2012). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 17/2012. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094538> concludes that two-thirds rule of London stock exchange was not the 
catalyst for dispersion of ownership and control that might have been expected.  
97 For example in European stock exchanges like Frankfurt Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange etc. 
Gelöscht:  
Gelöscht: allows
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the host country and at the same time ensures that the companies adhere to the deposit 
agreements. Deposit agreements follow a strict set of disclosures, thus jurisdictions 
which allow ADR and GDR automatically ensures that companies which choose to issue 
ADR or GDR has to comply with strict standards. Whether the ADR/GDR purchaser 
would be able to vote depends on the depository agreements, however from a pro-
shareholder view any equity investment should be able to exert proportionate control. 
Thus, shareholder primacy corporate governance would allow default voting rights for 
depository receipts to be on a par with domestic equity shares.  
 2 if by law external auditors need to be changed after 1-5 years and some cooling off 
period, 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding code, 0 otherwise.  
A regular change in the external auditor would ensure that management always remains 
at arms-length from the auditors. A quick glance at major corporate fraud like the Enron 
scandal, Satyam scandal98 would suggest that in many cases it was the willing oversight 
of the auditors which led to the delayed discovery of fraud. Thus, a pro-shareholder 
corporate governance policy would favour a change of auditors at regular intervals so 
that the integrity of the financial information/disclosure is maintained. 
 2 each if it is mandatory for presence of audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee with a majority of independent directors, 1 if it recommended by 
a code, 0 otherwise. 
NEDs are supposed to act as an internal control mechanism looking at a long-term view. 
Through these committees they are supposed to keep watch on executive directors and 
managers, appoint auditors, fix remuneration of the executives and maintain continuity 
with nominating executives for the top positions. The majority rule has to be enforced 
by statutory binding regulation. Independent directors are those directors who do not 
                                                            
98 Criminal prosecution of auditors is still on-going 
Gelöscht: Thus
Gelöscht: long term
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have any financial interest in the company and whose remuneration is not linked with 
performance. 
 2 if the country has legal protection for whistle-blowers, 1 if it is recommended in a 
non-binding corporate governance code etc., 0 otherwise. 
Minority shareholders rights index 
 Ability to influence an electing member of board – 2 if cumulative voting is allowed, 1 
if it is recommended but discretionary, 0 otherwise.  
Shareholders should be allowed to have effective control over the board by electing its 
members. Most jurisdictions offer shareholders the opportunity to elect members but in 
a shareholder primacy system cumulative voting would be allowed as minority 
shareholders would then be able to pool their votes for certain board candidates.  
 Prohibit abusive self-dealing - A score of 0 if the board of directors, the supervisory 
board or shareholders must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder is permitted 
to vote, 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding code that the board of directors or 
the supervisory board must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder is not 
permitted to vote, 2 if it is mandatory that the self-dealing majority shareholder is not 
permitted to vote; 2 if shareholders must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder 
is not permitted to vote, 1 if it is recommended, 0 otherwise. A score of 0 is assigned if 
no disclosure is required 1 if disclosure on the terms of the transaction is recommended, 
2 if it is required; 2 if an external auditor is required to review the transaction before it 
takes place, 1 if it is recommended, 0 otherwise.  
A majority shareholder who is also a member of the board is at a distinct advantage 
over minority shareholders in terms of insider information and control. This may also 
lead to the diversion of company’s assets for personal gain and eventual expropriation. 
Therefore, a shareholder wealth maximisation of corporate governance would call for Gelöscht: Therefore
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strict regulations to limit any self-dealing, putting in place checks and balances like 
NEDs, external auditors and even approval in shareholder meetings. 
 Ability to take judicial recourse - 2 if direct or derivative suits are available for 100 
shareholders or shareholders holding a minimum of 5-10% of the share capital, 1 if 
more than 10% or more than 100 shareholders are required for a suit, 0 in other cases.  
Business judgment rule prevents courts from interfering in the internal decision-making 
process of a company, unless a sizeable number of shareholders approach the court. A 
pro-shareholder corporate governance policy would try to keep this threshold low so 
that even minority shareholders can approach the court to seek redressal in cases of 
oppression and mismanagement. Yet at the same time it should not be so low that the 
company has to always defend frivolous law suits.  
Anti-Stakeholder rights index  
 0 if under a regulation stakeholder representation is found/encouraged in board, 1 if it 
is discouraged by a non-binding code or if there is no menti n, 2 if it is prohibited by a 
binding regulation; 0 if under a regulation stakeholders or their representatives can be 
present/are encouraged to be present in shareholders meeting, 1 if it is discouraged by a 
non-binding code 2 if it is prohibited by a binding regulation and only shareholders can 
be present; 2 in the case of a unitary managing board where a majority of its members 
are directly elected by shareholders or are selected with the concurrence of the elected 
members of the board, 1 where under a non-binding code it is encouraged, 0 otherwise; 
0 if stakeholders find remedy inside company law, 1 where there is a non-binding code 
under which stakeholders other than shareholders are offered remedy outside of 
company law, 2 if the company code or the listing agreements do not have any provision 
for stakeholder remedies except for shareholders; 0 if the country has a code of ethics 
for directors which explicitly states that stakeholder rights come before any other 
shareholder rights, 1 if it is recommended that directors give due consideration to the 
rights of different stakeholders but does not state if one group has a higher claim than 
another, 2 if there is a mandatory code which mentions that shareholders have 
precedence over other stakeholders. Shareholder primacy corporate governance 
demands that stakeholders like creditors, employees, suppliers and customers are not 
Gelöscht: decision making
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represented at any stage of the decision-making process. They should find remedies 
outside the corporate law and corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, a 
jurisdiction which mandates dual board structure with stakeholder representation would 
score lower in the overall assessment. 
Gelöscht: decision making
Gelöscht: Therefore
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